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Abstract
In the wake of recent shipwrecks at the Strait of Sicily, the European Union and its 
Member States have come under renewed pressure to address rescue at sea. Saving lives 
at sea is not simply a question of enhancing eu rescue efforts, however, but requires 
eliminating third party sanctions that significantly impede the proper functioning of 
the international rescue regime. This article focuses on anti-smuggling laws and related 
instruments and their thorny relation to humanitarian acts. To improve rescue efforts at 
sea, as a first step all humanitarian acts need to be exempted from criminal sanctions 
(including the EU Directive 2002/90/ec). This needs to be accompanied by efforts to 
desecuritize rescue, separating rescue from border security concerns.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of recent shipwrecks at the Strait of Sicily, the European Union 
and its Member States have come under renewed pressure to address res-
cue at sea. 3 October 2013 a boat capsized on its way from Libya to Italy, less 
than half a mile from the Italian island Lampedusa. From approximately 
500 people only 155 were rescued, more than 350 people were presumed to have 
drowned in the Mediterranean.1 Only a few days later 11 October 2013 another 
1    T. Kington, ‘Lampedusa shipwreck: Italy to hold state funeral for drowned migrants’, The 
Guardian (9 October 2013).
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boat capsized, from about 200 people more than 30 drowned, bringing the offi-
cial count of people who have died over the last two decades trying to reach 
the southern borders of Europe to more than 20 000.2 These figures are based 
on bodies counted, cases known, unofficial numbers are much higher, as many 
drowned remain missing and unknown. Of the 20 000 deaths over the last two 
decades close to 7000 occurred in the Strait of Sicily, a small, usually easily 
navigable area of the Mediterranean, between Tunis and Lampedusa about 
80 nautical miles wide, extending at its east between Libya and Lampedusa to 
180 nautical miles, covered through the Search and Rescue Zones of Malta, Italy, 
Tunisia and Libya.3 This is a stretch of the Mediterranean that is anything but 
a deserted area with a significant number of commercial fishing fleets supple-
mented by military and maritime surveillance, under normal circumstances 
crossable within 24–48 hours. For many migrant boats, however, it has become 
a death trap. The paradox of the situation is apparent to most observers.
The Italian president Giorgio Napolitano speaks of a ‘slaughter of 
innocents’,4 Pope Francis of ‘vergogna’, shame triggered by complicity,5 and 
Jack Shenker from the Guardian calls it ‘a litany of largely avoidable loss’.6 
There is widespread consensus that these are preventable deaths, but how can 
they be prevented? Saving lives at sea is not simply a question of enhancing 
rescue efforts, but requires the elimination of sanctions for rescue at sea that 
significantly impede and counter the proper functioning of the international 
rescue regime.7 The problem is not geography or a lack of capacities, as often 
2    J. Kanter, ‘Drownings put migration at fore of European Meeting’, New York Times (23 October 
2013); iom (2013) ‘iom mourns Lampedusa shipwreck victims: dg statement’, Press Release 
4 October 2013.
3    Fortress Europe (2013), available online at http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/01/ 
fortress-europe.html (accessed 31 October 2013).
4    L. Davies, ‘Lampedusa boat tragedy is “slaughter of innocents” says Italian president’, The 
Guardian (3 October 2013).
5    A. Geddes, ‘Letters: Shaming lesson behind the boat tragedy in Lampedusa’, The Guardian 
(8 October 2013).
6    J. Shenker, ‘Mediterranean migrant deaths: a litany of largely avoidable loss’, The 
Guardian (3 October 2013).
7    For the international rescue regime, see United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (unclos), 1833 unts 397, 10 December 1982 (entry into force 16 November 1994); 
International Convention on Salvage (Salvage Convention), 1953 unts 165, 28 April 1989 
(entry into force 14 July 1996); International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 
(sar), 1405 unts 118, 27 April 1979 (entry into force 22 June 1985); International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (solas), 1184 unts 3, 1 November 1974 (entry into force 25 May 
1980).
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portrayed in eu debates, but the sanctioning of rescue. The investigations into 
the left-to-die boat (2011), which returned after fourteen days adrift in the Strait 
of Sicily with only eleven of seventy-two passengers alive illustrates merely the 
tip of the iceberg: Survivors recount encounters with military helicopters, ships 
and a number of fishing vessels – nobody comes to rescue, however; on the 
contrary many leave swiftly and even fail to inform the maritime authorities.8 
This is not a unique case. Testimonies of passengers and seafarers at the Strait 
of Sicily confirm a tendency to turn away from boats with irregular migrants, 
even if in distress, as to avoid costly investigations, detention or possible pros-
ecution, leading to a rising number of people left to their fate at the seas. Many 
could have been rescued and alive, were it not for lack of fellow human beings 
ignoring their requests.
While there is a general legal duty to render assistance at sea, over the last 
decades an increasing number of laws, regulations and practices on national, 
regional and international levels have effectively discouraged rescue at sea and 
encouraged seafarers to look away, leading to the incremental institutional-
ization of a norm of indifference to the lives of migrants. Many of the laws 
that discourage rescue at sea are embedded in efforts to prevent, criminalize 
and punish facilitation of crossing borders by third parties – widely known as 
smuggling, assistance and facilitation – with the declared objectives of pro-
tecting victims of smuggling and targeting organised crime. This legislation 
has provided a fertile ground for the securitization of rescue, and as a result 
hereof the weakening of the international rescue regime.
Contributing to contemporary eu debates on saving lives at sea, this article 
analyzes an occasionally present, but largely marginalized aspect of the pres-
ent debate: legal instruments and practices that discourage rescue. Thereby, 
it focuses on anti-smuggling laws and related instruments and analyzes their 
thorny relation to humanitarian acts. Starting with a study of eu proposals 
to save lives at sea, part two addresses the fault lines between security and 
rescue. Through the cases of Cap Anamur (2009) and Morthada/El-Hedi 
(2009), part three demonstrates the adverse effects of anti-smuggling laws on 
third party rescue at sea. Part four addresses the inherent challenges of anti- 
smuggling laws in protecting humanitarian acts. The conclusion contains 
some thoughts and recommendations on safeguarding humanitarian acts in 
8    J. Shenker, ‘Aircraft carrier left us to die, say migrants’, The Guardian (8 May 2011); T. Strik, Lives 
lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible?, Report for the Parliamentary Assembly, 
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Council of Europe, 29 March 2012; 
C. Heller, L. Pezzani and Situ Studio (2012) Forensic Oceanography – Report on the ‘Left-To-Die 
Boat’, Centre for Research Architecture, Goldsmiths, University of London.
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liberal democracies under conditions of security.9 In the course of this article 
the formulation ‘anti-smuggling’ will be used in a wider sense, as to include 
criminal laws targeting third party assistance and facilitation.10
2 The eu’s Agenda for Saving Lives at Sea
The sequence of catastrophic events at the Strait of Sicily early October 2013 
has led to the reinvigoration of debates across European Union institutions 
on saving lives at sea. Within a few weeks the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the European Council, all released statements on 
the need to prevent these tragedies from happening again. Shortly after the 
3 October incident, the Justice and Home Affairs Council discussed during 
their meeting 7–8 October 2013 ‘actions that are needed to avoid such trage-
dies’11 and proposed setting-up the Task Force Mediterranean (tfm) to identify 
solutions; the Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmstrom proposed 
8 October 2013 to ‘deploy an extensive Frontex search and rescue operation 
that will cover the Mediterranean from Cyprus to Spain’;12 the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution to save lives at sea on 23 October 2013;13 and 
the European Council put rescue on its agenda for its summit on the 24 and 25 
October 2013 ‘express[ing] its deep sadness at the recent and dramatic death 
of hundreds of people in the Mediterranean which shocked all Europeans’ and 
demanded that ‘determined action should be taken in order to prevent the loss 
of lives at sea and to avoid that such human tragedies happen again’.14 After 
this first round of commitments in October, the core agenda of the European 
Union in response to the 3-October disaster has started to be shaped by the 
Task Force Mediterranean. This section explores current eu proposals with a 
focus on Task Force Mediterranean’s Communication released early December 
2013, as to understand the eu’s agenda for preventing further deaths at sea.
9     See also T. Basaran, ‘The curious state of the Good Samaritan: Humanitarianism under 
conditions of security”, in C. Kinnvall and T. Svensson (eds), Governing Bodies and Security: 
The Politics of Connectivity and Dispersal (London: Routledge, 2014). Chapter 4.
10    See part 4 for the untoc definition.
11    Council of the European Union, Press Release, 3260th Council Meeting, Justice and Home 
Afffairs, 14149/13, 8 October 2013.
12    European Commission, Commissioner Malmstrom’s Intervention on Lampedusa during 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council Press Conference, Memo/13/864, 8 October 2013.
13    European Parliament, Resolution 2013/2827, 23 October 2013.
14    European Council, European Council 24/25 October 2013 – Conclusions, euco 169/13, 
25 October 2013, para. 46.
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2.1 A Common Platform
In search for a common platform for action, the European institutions estab-
lished the Task Force Mediterranean and entrusted it with identifying solutions 
to save lives at sea, as proposed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council, and in 
principle endorsed by the European Parliament. The European Council invited 
the Task Force Mediterranean to ‘identify – based on principles of prevention, 
protection and solidarity – priority actions for a more efficient short term use 
of European policies and tools’.15 The European Commission, as chair of the 
Task Force Mediterranean, organised two meetings, on 24 October 2013 and 20 
November 2013, with all Member States, the European External Action Service 
and various eu Agencies, including the European Asylum Support Office 
(easo), European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), 
Europol, European Maritime Safety Agency (emsa) and the Fundamental 
Rights Agency (fra).16 The meetings resulted in a Communication, endorsed 
by the Justice and Home Affairs Council at its meeting on 5–6 December 2013 
and by the European Council on 19–20 December 2013. In its Communication, 
the Task Force Mediterranean identifies five areas of action with 38 action 
points in total:17 1. Cooperation with third countries (15 action points); 
2. Regional protection programmes, resettlement and reinforced legal ways 
to access Europe (5 action points); 3. Fight against trafficking, smuggling and 
organised crime (8 action points); 4. Reinforced border surveillance contribut-
ing to enhancing maritime situational picture and to the protection and saving 
of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean (6 action points) and 5. Assistance 
and solidarity with Member States dealing with high migration pressures 
(4 action points).
The Communication underlines three co-supportive agendas for reducing 
deaths at sea: a prevention agenda, a security agenda and a rescue agenda. The 
prevention agenda seeks to prevent migrants from reaching the coastal shore 
as to be able to commence their maritime journey; it seeks both to incentiv-
ize migrants to use legal routes and equally deter them through security mea-
sures from boarding. This agenda is targeted primarily through cooperation 
15    European Council, European Council 24/25 October 2013 – Conclusions, euco 169/13, 
25 October 2013, paras 48, 49.
16    Others consulted include the Associated Countries, unhcr, iom, icmpd, mpc, imo, 
unodc and Interpol.
17    European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean, com (2013) 
869 final, 4 December 2013.
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with third countries (area 1), alternative legal avenues (area 2) and by deter-
rence through reinforced border surveillance. The security agenda is reflected 
in efforts to counter smuggling, trafficking and organised crime (area 3) and to 
increase border surveillance (area 4), both together underlying the importance 
of strengthening policing efforts. In contrast to the prevention and security 
agenda, the rescue agenda of the European Union, focusing on saving lives at 
seas is narrowly conceived. No specific area is dedicated to rescue at sea; the 
very word rescue appears only in 2 of the 38 action points (points 1.9 and 3.8) 
and actions that seek to improve safety of migrants on the seas, target ques-
tions of safe passage or saving lives at sea are limited in the Communication to 
less than a handful of points.
2.2 The Rescue Agenda
The eu’s rescue agenda, focusing on saving lives on the seas, is not only mar-
ginal to the Communication, but to a large extent merged with and even 
subsumed under the security agenda. Under area 4, ‘Reinforced border surveil-
lance contributing to enhancing maritime situational picture and to the pro-
tection and saving of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean’, rescue is largely 
equated with enhanced border surveillance. The Communication promotes a 
joint security/rescue agenda of border security and protection of lives under 
the aegis of Frontex, built upon the supposition that it is possible and efficient 
to address security concerns and rescue efforts together. The ‘objective is to 
have a comprehensive and coordinated approach to border surveillance opera-
tions led by Frontex in the Mediterranean (from Cyprus to Spain)’ (point 4.1).18 
To increase operational and coordination capacities for rescue missions, the 
Communication proposes the reinforcement of Frontex, complemented by 
technological fortification through Eurosur and legal buttressing through The 
Frontex Sea Borders Regulation.
More specifically, the rescue agenda of the eu consists of the following 
three parts: First and primarily, it seeks to enhance the role of Frontex. Frontex 
18    This is in line with the initial proposal of Cecilia Malmstrom, European Commissioner 
for Home Affairs, dating from 8 October 2013 for an ‘extensive Frontex search and res-
cue operation that will cover the Mediterranean from Cyprus to Spain’ to ‘help lead to 
quicker tracking, identifying and the rescuing of more vessels and boats and, therefore, 
prevent the loss of lives at sea’. European Commission, Commissioner Malmstrom’s 
Intervention on Lampedusa during the Justice and Home Affairs Council Press Confer-
ence, Memo/13/864, 8 October 2013. European Comission, Press Release, Tragic accident 
outside Lampedusa: Statement by European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia 
Malmstrom, Memo/13/849, 3 October 2013. See also I. Traynor and T. Kington, ‘eu pressed 
to rethink immigration policy after Lampedusa tragedy’, The Guardian (8 October 2013).
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is explicitly mentioned in fifteen of the thirty-eight action points,19 more than 
any other eu agency or institution, and the only one to be mentioned across all 
five action areas. It is regarded as the frontline of European efforts for rescue, 
subsumed under matters of border surveillance, and expected to become the 
node of cooperation for intelligence and operations both with Member States 
and Third Countries. This reinforces the current trajectory of Frontex, which 
has already established itself since its founding in 2004 as the key coordina-
tion body in the Mediterranean and has coordinated close to fifty sea opera-
tions, many of which have targeted the Mediterranean.20 During this period its 
budget has increased exponentially from €6 million in 2004 to €94 million in 
2013.21 Border surveillance through Frontex is reinforced and complemented 
though, second, the technological component eurosur, a European border 
surveillance technology to track and identify small vessels, operational since 
December 2013.22 Along with an emphasis on operational capacities through 
Frontex and Eurosur, third, we find the intention to enhance the legal basis for 
Frontex-coordinated approaches through the Frontex Sea Borders Regulation 
(action point 4.2) and an invitation to accelerate negotiations hereto.23 This 
eu regulation, first proposed in 2010 provides the definition of distress that 
triggers a search and rescue operation (Article 9) and recommends rules of 
disembarkation (Article 10) as to avoid contradictory approaches amongst 
Member States. It is limited in its scope to operations coordinated by Frontex 
in the framework of eu border controls.24 To summarise, the rescue agenda is 
19    Frontex, see action points 1.1, 1.3, 1.7, 1.8, 1.10, 1.11, 2.4, 3.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 5.1, 5.3.
20    See Archive of Operations at Frontex, available online at http://frontex.europa.eu/
operations/archive-of-operations/ (accessed 30 October 2013).
21    Frontex, Budget 2013, 4 November 2013, available online at http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/
About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Budget/Budget_2013.pdf (accessed 18 December 
2013).
22    For Eurosur, see action points 1.8, 4.1, 4.4, 4.5.
23    European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing rules for surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of 
operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, com(2013) 197 final, 12 April 2013. All six Mediterranean Member States (Cyprus, 
France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain) oppose the Frontex Sea Borders Regulation; see 
S. Peers, ‘eu rules on maritime rescue: Member States quibble while migrants drown’, 
Statewatch Analysis (22 October 2013).
24    Peers (2013). Council Decision, supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the 
surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coor-
dinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 2010/252/eu, 26 April 2010 
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built upon institutional, technological and legal reinforcement of the current 
eu approach to the Mediterranean, seeking to integrate rescue within border 
control measures.
The rescue agenda is built upon the assumption that a proper functioning 
of the rescue regime is hampered due to a lack of operational capacities and 
coordination to detect vessels and provide timely help. It proposes to over-
come this deficiency through enhanced border surveillance. Greater levels of 
harmonization in information-sharing, decision-making and common opera-
tions, combined with an increase of surveillance capacities, it is argued, will 
lead to less loss of lives at sea. These solutions stem from a specific form of 
constituting the problem.25 The problem of migrant death at sea is hereby 
reduced to a natural problem of crossing the seas in unseaworthy vessels, a 
problem of geography and insufficient/uncoordinated rescue coverage, which 
can be countered by technical solutions stressing sufficient surveillance and 
operational coverage for better implementing the international rescue regime. 
This ignores the wider problematic of political and security issues at interplay 
causing and contributing to death at sea. Saving lives at sea is not simply a 
question of enhancing rescue efforts, but also a question of eliminating sanc-
tions as to permit widespread rescue efforts and allow the proper functioning 
of the international rescue regime.
2.3 Some Points Towards A Sanctions Agenda
In relation to the 3 October incident, Tom Kington from The Guardian is one 
of the very few to stress an important, but often neglected point: ‘After reports 
that some fishing boats had ignored the sinking vessel, local fisherman said 
they were often hesitant to pick up migrants at sea since they risked their boats 
being seized under Italy’s tough laws on illegal migrants.’26 Similarly, in the 
2011 investigation of the left-to-die boat, which returned after 14 days adrift 
in the Strait of Sicily with only eleven of seventy-two passengers alive, the 
Rapporteur to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Tineke 
Strik, stresses that certain measures ‘negatively affect the willingness of fishing 
vessels and other commercial shipping to fulfil their obligation of rescue at 
[oj L111/20]. European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the external sea borders 
in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Members States 
of the European Union, com(2013) 197 final, 12 April 2013.
25    M. Foucault, Polemics, Politics and Politicization, in M. Foucault and P. Rabinow, Ethics: 
Essential Works of Focault 1954–1984 (London: Penguin), pp. 111–119.
26    T. Kington, The Guardian (4 October 2013).
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sea’ including amongst these ‘the threat of criminal sanctions for aiding and 
abetting irregular migrants’.27 These statements only illustrate the tip of the 
iceberg. Testimonies of migrants and seafarers at the Strait of Sicily confirm a 
tendency to turn away from boats with irregular migrants, even if in distress, 
as to avoid costly investigations, detention or possible prosecution, leading to 
a rising number of people left to drown at seas. An important factor hereby 
are criminal sanctions imposed by anti-smuggling legislation and their adverse 
effects on rescue. This issue has also not remained unnoticed on the eu level.
The need to exempt humanitarian acts from criminal sanctions and secu-
rity concerns is placed – even if marginally – on the eu agenda. In its resolu-
tion from October 2013, in response to the 3 October incident, the European 
Parliament acknowledges and calls upon ‘eu and Member States to amend 
or review any legislation sanctioning people assisting migrants in distress at 
sea’ and requests ‘the Commission to review Council Directive 2002/90/EC’.28 
This is taken up by the Task Force Mediterranean, acknowledging the effect 
of sanctions and more specifically the negative effect of criminal sanctions on 
humanitarian acts in its Communication in two action points: Point 3.8 under 
the area ‘Fight against trafficking, smuggling and organised crime’ highlights 
that the Commission will evaluate, and if needed modify, Directive 2002/90 
‘by reconciling effective fight against smuggling with the need to avoid crimi-
nalising humanitarian assistance.’ Point 4.6 under the area ‘Reinforced border 
surveillance contributing to enhancing maritime situational picture and to the 
protection and saving of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean’ emphasizes 
the need to provide mariners ‘public reassurance’ that ‘provided they are acting 
in good faith, [they] would not face any negative legal consequences for pro-
viding . . . assistance’. These action points stress for the first time the criminal-
ization of third party rescue as a possible result of anti-smuggling and related 
legislation. Their focus is on the 2002 eu Council Directive 2002/90 defining 
the Facilitation of Unauthorized Entry, Transit and Residence,29 which partly 
27    T. Strik, Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible?, Report for the 
Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, 
Council of Europe, 29 March 2012, p. 18; see also J. Shenker, ‘Aircraft carrier left us to die, 
say migrants’, The Guardian (8 May 2011); Heller et al. (2012).
28    European Parliament, Resolution, Migratory flows in the Mediterranean with particular 
attention to the tragic events of Lampedusa, 2013/2827(rsp), 23 October 2013.
29    Council Directive 2002/90 of 28 November 2002 defining the Facilitation of Unauthorised 
Entry, Transit and Residence [oj L328/17] in combination with the Framework Decision 
on the Strengthening of the Penal Framework to Prevent the Facilitation of Unauthorised 
Entry, Transit and Residence 2002/946 [oj L328/1]; to be implemented by Member States 
by December 2004. The Framework Decision complements the Directive by providing 
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supersedes the Schengen Convention of 199030 and requires Member States to 
create criminal offences for aiding unauthorized entry, transit and residence.
Whilst these are laudable efforts, the question of sanctions remains insuf-
ficiently addressed in terms of its significance and in terms of its complexity. 
In the following we shall seek to address these issues more in-depth by focus-
ing on anti-smuggling laws and their relation to humanitarian acts. The chal-
lenges of protecting humanitarian acts shall be explored through the cases of 
Cap Anamur (2009) and Morthada/El Hedi (2009) in part three, followed by 
an analysis of anti-smuggling laws and their inherent difficulty in protecting 
humanitarian acts in part four.
3 On Anti-Smuggling Laws and Adverse Effects
Two prosecutions had an important impact on the transnational community 
of fishermen at the Strait of Sicily31 and compellingly illustrate the role of anti-
smuggling laws in sanctioning rescue. Even though all defendants are eventu-
ally acquitted the cases of Cap Anamur (2009) and Morthada/El-Hedi (2009) 
demonstrate that rescue at sea is a sanctioned enterprise and greatly influence 
the conduct of seafarers, willing to increasingly turn away from boats with 
irregular migrants, even if in distress, as to avoid crime by association, costly 
investigations and possible prosecutions, leading to a number of people left 
to their fate at seas. In both cases defendants claim rescue; the prosecution 
claims aiding and abetting crime by assisting/ smuggling irregular migrants.
3.1 The Trials of Agrigento
The first trial is against three members of the organisation Cap Anamur.32 Cap 
Anamur is a humanitarian organisation founded in 1979, at the height of the 
minimum rules for penalties, applicable both to natural persons and legal persons, stress-
ing that Member States shall ensure that infringements shall be punishable by criminal 
penalties (Framework Decision, Article 1.1).
30    The Convention foresees penalties, not necessarily criminal sanctions. Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement 1990 of 14 June 1985 (The Schengen Acquis oj 
L176).
31    Strik (2012).
32    Cap Anamur, Tribunale di Agrigento, I Sezione Penale, I Collegio, 954/2009. See also: 
F. Vassallo Palelogo (2010) ‘Il caso Cap Anamur. Assolto l’intervento umanitario’, 
Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza (no. 2); A. Huemer (2011), ‘Safety and Rescue at 
Sea: Contentious Legal Issues and Their Potential Detrimental Effect on Boat People’, 
in: V. Dzihic and T. Schmidinger (eds), Looming Shadows; Migration and Integration 
 375Saving Lives At Sea
European Journal of Migration and Law 16 (2014) 365–387
refugee crisis at the South China Sea, to provide support to boat people. On 20 
June 2004 Cap Anamur, the vessel of the same name organisation sailing under 
the German flag, takes 37 people in distress between Libya and Italy on board. 
It accompanies a second boat encountered towards Malta and requests June 
30 permission to dock at the port of Empedolce in Sicily, Italy. It is denied per-
mission. After waiting for twelve days, Cap Anamur cites distress on the ves-
sel, enforcing debarkation, and proceeds to the port. Upon arrival the director, 
captain and first officer of Cap Anamur are detained and their vessel is seized 
under charges of aiding irregular immigration. The Cap Anamur trial begins 
two years later, November 2006 and lasts for three years. Prosecution demands 
a fine of €400 000 per person and imprisonment of four years for assisting 
irregular entry under the aggravated circumstances clause. The director of 
Cap Anamur, Elias Bierdel, captain Stefan Schmidt and first officer Vladimir 
Dachkevitch are tried on charges of assisting irregular entry under the Italian 
legislation 286/1998, Article 12(1) punishing facilitation of unauthorized entry 
and Article 12(3) providing for aggravating circumstances for organised crime.33 
Charges of assisting irregular entry are based on two claims: the meaning of 
procuring a profit and a false declaration to gain access to debarkation. The 
prosecutor claims that defendants had sought to procure a profit through 
their action, specifying that ‘to procure a profit whether direct or indirect – 
also consisted in the advertising and international publicity obtained in the 
sale of third-party images and information relative to the facts of the process’.34 
Further, the defendants are accused of false declaration of a medical emer-
gency as to be allowed to disembark and facilitate illegal entry.35 The Cap 
Anamur case not only demonstrates the uses of anti-smuggling law, but also 
that the distinction between for-profit and non-profit assistance provides an 
uneasy separation between criminal and non-criminal acts – a point to which 
at a Time of Upheaval; European and American Perspectives, Washington, dc: Center 
for Transatlantic Relations, pp. 49–70; D. Arntz (ed.) (2009) Ein Fluechtlingspolitik der 
Europaeischen Union: Ein Reader, Berlin: Bildungswerk Berlin der Heinrich-Boell Stiftung.
33    cp, Article 110; dl 286/98, Article 12 i, iii e, iii bis.
34    Original text ‘al fine di procurarisi un profitto sia diretto che indiretto – anche consistito 
nella pubblicita e risonanza internazionale ottenuta ed inoltre un profito relativo alla 
vendita a terzi della immagini e delle informazioni relative ai fatti per cui e processo – 
utilizando la motonave ‘cap anamur’ battente bandiera tedesca’.
35    Original text ‘prospettando falsamente alle Autorita dello Stato competenti una situazi-
one di emergenza anche sanitaria a bordo della nave, compivano attivita diretta a favorire 
l’ingresso clandestine nel territorio nazionale di 37 cittadini extracomunitario’.
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this article will return later in the discussion of anti-smuggling legislation. In 
the verdict, announced in October 2009, all three defendants are acquitted.36
Whilst the Cap Anamur trial is the more widely publicized case, a second 
trial takes place roughly in the same time period and is directed against all 
seven crewmembers of two Tunisian fishing boats, Fakhreddine Morthada 
and Mohamed el-Hedi.37 On 8 August 2007 the fishermen of both boats take 
44 people in distress close to Lampedusa on-board. All the crew is detained 
upon arrival. The trial begins only two weeks later, 22 August 2007, and 
lasts for two years. Similar to the Cap Anamur trial, the crewmembers are 
tried on charges of smuggling, under the 1998 Italian legislation 286/1998, 
Article 12(1) punishing facilitation of unauthorized entry and Article 12(3) pro-
viding for aggravating circumstances for organised crime.38 The verdict is read 
out November 2009, a few weeks after the Cap Anamur trial. Whilst the tribunal 
of Agrigento acquits all seven fishermen of aiding illegal immigration, captains 
Abdelkarim Bayoudh and Abdelbasset Zenzeri are convicted of ‘charges of 
resisting a public officer and committing violence against a warship’39 as they 
proceeded with their boats to Lampedusa, disrespecting non-disembarkation 
orders. Both captains are condemned to imprisonment of 2.5 years and a pen-
alty of €440 000 each, but are acquitted by the Court of Appeal of Palermo on 
22 September 2011.
Even though both cases eventually end in acquittal for the defendants, they 
prove that rescue at sea is a sanctioned enterprise and shape future human 
conduct at seas. The trials increase and expose costs associated with rescue 
and substantially elevate barriers for rescue at sea. Rescue at sea becomes an 
operation that small fishing boats and even larger commercial vessels cannot 
afford. The trials last for many years absorbing the energies and economic 
resources of the accused; the suspects are detained, some placed under house 
arrest; the vessels are confiscated over prolonged periods of time; the boats of 
the Tunisian fishermen become unusable due to damages and after the trial 
their licences for fishing on the high seas are denied, effectively amounting 
to loss of their economic livelihoods.40 As Captain Schmidt expresses in a 
sombre assessment of the verdict ‘[i]f seafarers at sea notice a refugee boat, 
they know, that we stood trial for three years. The acquittal does then perhaps 
36    Verdict was read on 7 October 2009, published 15 February 2010.
37    Bayoudh and Zenzeri, Tribunale di Agrigento, Sezione Penale Feriale, 1107/2009 and Court 
of Appeal of Palermo, iii Sezione Penale, 2932/2011.
38    cp, Article 110; dl 286/98 iiie, iii bis; cpp 530, sec. Comma.
39    Original text: ‘resistenza a pubblico ufficiale’ and ‘violenza contro nave da guerra’.
40    Arntz (2009).
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not play an important role anymore.’41 The process amounts to punishment.42 
Hence, even in the absence of civil or criminal penalties, the costs of the crimi-
nal procedure effectively provide for a sanction and deterrence function. This 
is intentional. As the prosecutor of Agrigento, Ignacio de Francisci, highlights 
it is important ‘to avoid the repetition of these kinds of actions, even if they 
happen due to a noble purpose’.43
These cases demonstrate how even a duty, anchored in national and inter-
national law, can be selectively undermined (targeting irregular migrants only) 
through a system of legal sanctions. Anti-smuggling legislation can be used 
to sanction rescue, even though rescue is firmly anchored in national and 
international legislation. The duty to render assistance is codified in various 
international conventions, including the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (unclos), the 1974 International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (solas), the 1979 International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue (sar) and the 1989 International Convention on Salvage 
(salvage). More specifically, Italian legislation provides for the duty to ren-
der assistance at sea in the Navigation Code,44 but also provides for a more 
general assistance in the Italian Civil and the state of necessity clause in the 
Penal Code45 and even explicitly exempts relief efforts and humanitarian 
41    Die Zeit, ‘Der Staatsanwalt hat uns zum Freispruch gratuliert’, Die Zeit Online (8 October 
2009), available online at http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2009-10/cap-anamur-
kapitaen (accessed 10 March 2013). Original text: ‘Das Kind ist ja teilweise schon in den 
Brunnen gefallen: Wenn Seeleute auf See ein Flüchtlingsboot sehen, dann wissen sie, dass 
wir drei Jahre vor Gericht standen. Der Freispruch spielt dann vielleicht gar keine große 
Rolle mehr.’
42    M.M. Feeley (1979), The Process is Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower Criminal Court, 
London: Russell Sage Foundation.
43    B. Hans, ‘Urteil im Cap-Anamur-Prozess: Freispruch fuer den Einzelkaempfer’, Spiegel 
(7 October 2009), available online at http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/urteil-
im-cap-anamur-prozess-freispruch-fuer-den-einzelkaempfer-a-653762.html (accessed 10 
March 2013). Original text: ‘Oberstaatsanwalt von Agrigent, Ignacio de Francisci, sagte vor 
dem Prozess, man habe gegen Bierdel und die zwei Mitarbeiter einfach vorgehen müssen: 
Man sei “in rechtlicher und auch in politischer Hinsicht gezwungen, die Wiederholung 
solcher Aktionen zu verhindern, auch wenn sie aus edler Absicht geschehen”. Ansonsten 
würde riskiert, “trojanische Pferde hereinzulassen, mit denen Tausende von Leuten zu 
uns kommen würden”.’
44    Codice della Navigazione, Article 1158.
45    Italian civil code, Article 245; Penal Code, Article 54: ‘Anyone who has committed an 
act having been compelled to do so by the necessity of saving himself or others from 
the risk of an imminent personal injury, that was not voluntarily caused, nor otherwise 
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assistance in the consolidated immigration legislation.46 Even though there is 
a general legal duty to render assistance at sea, supported by various humani-
tarian clauses, ultimately these clauses fail to exempt seafarers from criminal 
prosecution. As demonstrated through the Agrigento trials, prosecution is suf-
ficient to subvert a positive duty, a demand to act rather than to restrain from 
an action.
3.2 Legal Framework
At stake are in both cases aiding and abetting crime under the Italian penal 
code in the matter of clandestine immigration and for disregarding orders of 
disembarkation.47 The legal basis of both cases is the 1998 Legislative Decree 
286/1998 (Turco-Napolitano Act), which consolidated immigration legisla-
tion and contains clauses that criminalize the facilitation and smuggling of 
migrants.48 The relevant articles hereto are: Article 12(1) specifies that facili-
tation of unauthorized entry can be punished by fines of up to €15,000 and 
imprisonment of up to three years, even if conducted without purpose of finan-
cial gain. Article 12(3) declares aggravating circumstances for organised crime, 
that is if three or more persons committed the crime for profit and facilitated 
the entry of five or more persons. Under aggravating circumstances 4–12 years 
of imprisonment and fines of €15,000 for each person entered are foreseen.
 avoidable . . . (shall not be punished for that conduct) . . . as long as the action is propor-
tional to the danger.’
46    Consolidated Immigration Act no. 286/98, Article 12, comma 2: ‘Without prejudice to the 
provisions of Article 54 of the Penal Code, rescue and humanitarian relief provided in 
Italy to foreigners in need still present in the State’s territory, do not constitute a criminal 
offense’; ‘Fermo restando quanto previsto dall’articolo 54 del codice penale, non costituis-
cono reato le attività di soccorso e assistenza umanitaria prestate in Italia nei confronti 
degli stranieri in condizioni di bisogno comunque presenti nel territorio dello Stato.’
47    C.P., Article 110, dl 286/1998, Article 12. The latter specifies that procuring illegal entry 
shall be punished with imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of up to €15,000 for 
each person (idem, Article 12.1), to profit, even indirectly, from illegal migration shall be 
punished with imprisonment of four to fifteen years and a fine of €15,000 for each person 
(idem, Article 12.3). These penalties increase under aggravating circumstance, if the ille-
gal entry or stay concerns five or more persons (idem, Article 12.3, 3-bis.a) or if the offense 
is committed by three or more people (idem, Article 12.3, 3-bis.c-bis). ((Further, in the 
case of Tunisian fishermen, 530, secondo comma, c.p.p. relevant).
48    Decreto Legislativo, no. 286/1998, ‘Testo Unico delle Disposizioni concernenti la 
Disciplina dell’Immigrazione e Norme sulla Condizione dello Straniero’, 25 July 1998 9GU 
191, 18 August 1998).
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It is important to understand that the subversion of duties through anti-
smuggling laws is not an Italian problem, a question of inconsistent legal 
 practice or otherwise due to unique circumstances. This legislation and its 
history reflect a widespread mounting normative consensus on the need to 
criminalize smugglers, held culpable for the suffering and death of migrants, 
leading to an incessant call for more severe forms of criminalization of smug-
gling, trafficking and organised crime, and, thus, creating the foundation for 
a multiplication of laws and an increase penalties. Hereby, often assistance, 
smuggling and trafficking is discursively combined to one homogenous group 
of exploiters of human misery, prying on the vulnerability of their victims, held 
responsible for putting ‘people’s lives at risk in small, overcrowded and unsea-
worthy vessels’.49 They are found guilty of providing unseaworthy vessels, with-
out proper guidance and support, insufficiently informing their clients about 
the risk, and imprudently limiting availability of water and food.50 Any assis-
tance to cross borders irregularly is presented in this framework as ruthless 
organised crime with disregard for human life and human safety. This response 
is shared – in a rare instance of unity – by security agencies, humanitarian 
organisations and civil society critiques alike.51
It is within this rising normative consensus that there is an increasing resort 
to legal instruments on national, European and international levels to punish 
and criminalize smuggling. In Italy facilitating unauthorized entry becomes 
a criminal offence in 1986, limited then in its scope to unauthorized entry 
for labour exploitation only (Law 943/1986)52 and is extended in its scope in 
1990, applicable now more regardless of purpose of entry (Law 39/1990).53 This 
49    European Comission, Press Release, Tragic accident outside Lampedusa: Statement by 
European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmstrom, Memo/13/849 (3 October 
2013).
50    Reports of nato, Frontex, eu.
51    Shenker (2013); Strik (2012).
52    Act 943/1986, Norme in Materia di Collocamento e di Trattamento dei Lavaratori 
Extracomunitari Immigrati e Contro le Immigrazioni Clandestine, Gazzetta Ufficiale 
no. 8, dated 12 January 1987. See also M.V. McCreight (2006), ‘Crimes of Assisting Illegal 
Immigration and Trafficking in Human Beings in Italian Law: Illegal Immigration Between 
Administrative Infringement and Criminal Offence’, in: E. Guild and P. Minderhoud (eds) 
(2006) Immigration and Criminal Law: the legal measures and social consequences of crimi-
nal law in Member States on trafficking and smuggling in human beings, Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, pp. 141–168; M. Ventralla (2010) The Control of People Smuggling and Trafficking in 
the eu: Experiences from the uk and Italy, Burlington, vt: Ashgate.
53    Act 39/1990, Gazetta Ufficiale no. 49, dated 28 February 1990.
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provides the basis for 1998 Decree. The Consolidated Immigration Legislation 
(dl 286/1998) is modified in the following years by Law 189/2002 (Bossi-Fini 
Act) taking into account questions European borders and transit through 
Italian territory54 and by Act 94/2009 increasing penalties for facilitating 
irregular migration and abolishing the previous distinction between assist-
ing irregular migration and smuggling of migrants, the distinction between 
non-profit and for-profit, between individual and organised crime.55 Article 12 
now more targets anyone who ‘promotes, manages, organizes, finances or car-
riers out the transport of foreigners’, allowing the criminalization of a wide 
range of third parties, much in line with the prosecution’s interpretation in the 
Cap Anamur case.
The stages of the Italian legislation largely correlate with penalization and 
criminalization efforts on the European and international levels: the introduc-
tion of the Schengen Convention in 1990 and its entry into force in 199556 – with 
its penalty clause – and the Directive 2002/90/ec in 2002, partly superseding 
the Schengen Convention. The timing of the Italian and European legislation 
also correlates with the General Assembly resolution in 1998, leading to the 
travaux prépatoire for untoc and the negotiation of its Palermo Protocols 
from 1999 until 2002, setting the global standards in anti-smuggling legisla-
tion. Rather than a mono-directional legislative dissemination, these diverse 
initiatives and efforts at criminalizing smuggling need to be understood as 
concurring trends on national, European and international levels, with rein-
forcing effects upon each other, equally providing an increasing justificatory 
arsenal for criminalizing assistance. The situation in Italy reflects European 
and international developments. Hence, to a certain extent, it is these legal 
instruments that are equally tested in the 2009 trials against Cap Anamur 
and Morthada/El-Hedi. The trials illustrate the fundamentally complicated 
relationship between anti-smuggling legislations and humanitarian acts: the 
adverse effect of anti-smuggling laws and the difficulty of protecting humani-
tarian acts from criminal sanctions. The next section will focus on the legal 
instruments and explore the difficulties of setting clear boundaries between 
smuggling and humanitarian acts as a problem inherent to anti-smuggling leg-
islation and related instruments.
54    Act 189/2002, 30 July 2002.
55    Act 94/2009, Disposizioni in Material di Sicurezza Publica, gu 170, 25.07.2009.
56    Entry into force in Italy in 1997; see on this point also McCreight 2006, p. 146.
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4 The Challenge of Protecting Humanitarian Acts
Whereas at first sight the distinction between acts of smuggling and rescue 
appear to be obvious, anti-smuggling laws demonstrate the difficulties of 
setting an impermeable boundary between humanitarian acts and criminal 
acts, and a resulting ambivalence between protection and criminalization of 
humanitarian acts. The following will provide an analysis of the multiple rela-
tions of anti-smuggling legislation to humanitarian acts, to illustrate the fluid 
boundaries between criminal acts and humanitarian acts – as to understand 
the difficulty of protecting humanitarian acts. More specifically, we will focus 
on the for-profit/non-profit distinction (Section 4.1), the scope of criminaliza-
tion (Section 4.2), and their effects upon social relations (Section 4.3) to under-
stand the challenges of protecting rescue within anti-smuggling legislation.
4.1 The Protection of Humanitarian Acts: For Profit/Non-Profit 
Distinctions
At the outset anti-smuggling legislation appears to safeguard humanitarian 
acts from criminalization by excluding them from their subject matter. The 
international anti-smuggling convention, United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (untoc) and its Protocols, recommend the 
deployment of criminal sanctions for smuggling migrants (sm, Article 6), but 
exclude humanitarian acts from its subject matter through the very defini-
tion of smuggling. According to the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Sea and Air (sm) ‘smuggling of migrants’ refers to the ‘procurement, 
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, 
of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not 
a national or a permanent resident’ (Article 3(a)). The element of financial 
or material gain is crucial to the definition of smuggling; humanitarian and 
other non-profit acts, even if they contribute to the irregular entry of a per-
son, are not to be considered as smuggling and, hence, do not fall under the 
Convention. This approach is also underlined through secondary sources, such 
as the Model Law Interpretation, which states:
The reference in this definition to ‘a financial or other material benefit’ 
was included in order to emphasize that the intention was to include the 
activities of organised criminal groups acting for profit, but to exclude 
the activities of those who provided support to migrants for humanitar-
ian reasons or on the basis of close family ties. As noted in the interpre-
tative notes, it was not the intention of the Protocol to criminalize the 
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activities of family members or support groups such as religious or non-
governmental organisations.57
Through a distinction between for-profit and non-profit acts as part of the 
smuggling definition, untoc and its Protocols provide an, albeit implicit, 
protection of humanitarian acts.58 This distinction between commercial and 
humanitarian approaches was also crucial for the Schengen Convention of 
1990, limiting penalties for assistance to irregular migration, including assis-
tance to enter or reside, to purposes of gain (Article 27.1).59
The 2002 eu Directive defining the Facilitation of Unauthorized Entry, 
Transit and Residence,60 that partly superseded the Schengen Convention, 
has been criticised for lifting this distinction and rendering humanitarian 
protection optional – hence opening up the possibility for prosecutions. This 
Directive requires Member States to create criminal offences for aiding unau-
thorized entry, transit and residence, and ignores humanitarian protection by 
simply omitting the distinction between profit and non-profit acts. Assisting 
to enter and transit requires in the Directive only the element of intentional 
57    United Nations, General Assembly, Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux 
préparatoires) of the negotiation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (A/55/383/Add.1), para. 88.
58    United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (untoc), unts 
I39574, 15 November 2000, including the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air (sm), unts A29574, 15 November 2000 and the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (tip), 
15 November 2000. The Convention and its three Protocols, targeting particular areas of 
organized crime, were adopted by the General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 
2000. The Convention entered into force on 29 September 2003, the tp Protocol on 
25 December 2003 and the sm Protocol on 28 January 2004.
59    The Convention foresees penalties, not necessarily criminal sanctions. Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement 1990 of 14 June 1985 (The Schengen Acquis 
oj L176).
60    Council Directive 2002/90 of 28 November 2002 defining the Facilitation of Unauthorised 
Entry, Transit and Residence (oj L328/17) in combination with the Framework Decision 
on the Strengthening of the Penal Framework to Prevent the Facilitation of Unauthorised 
Entry, Transit and Residence 2002/946 (oj L328/1) to be implemented by Member States 
by December 2004. The Framework Decision complements the Directive by providing 
minimum rules for penalties, applicable both to natural persons and legal persons, stress-
ing that Member States shall ensure that infringements shall be punishable by criminal 
penalties (Framework Decision, Article 1.1).
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assistance (Article 1.1.a) but not of financial gain.61 Herewith eu legislation 
effectively annuls the distinction between commercial and humanitarian 
motives for assisting to enter and transit, integral to the definition of smug-
gling in untoc and its Protocols. The 2002 Directive provides only an optional 
humanitarian exception clause, stating that Member States ‘may decide not to 
impose sanctions . . . where the aim of the behavior is to provide humanitar-
ian assistance to the person concerned’ (Article 1.2). Not requiring Member 
States to refrain from prosecuting humanitarian actors and providing this as 
an option only, the eu legislation is accused of opening up possibilities for 
targeting humanitarian actors with criminal sanctions.62 This is also at the 
heart of the eu proposals to lift sanctions against rescue. Undoubtedly, the 
2002 eu Directive needs to be brought in line with untoc and its Protocols 
and re-establish the distinction between for-profit and non-profit motives; 
this would be necessary to confirm the legal norm, but still not be sufficient to 
safeguard humanitarian acts from anti-smuggling and related legislation. It is 
often assumed that the non-distinctive nature of eu legislation poses the root 
of the problem, to be remedied by applying international standards. The chal-
lenges of protecting humanitarian acts is, however, more complex.
Even the boundaries set by untoc between for-profit and non-profit acts 
are blurred, leading to vague and imprecise distinctions between smuggling 
and humanitarian acts. Anti-smuggling laws that seek to safeguard humanitar-
ian acts try to differentiate between acts according to the motives of the actors: 
criminal sanctions need to be motivated by commercial objectives, distinct 
from non-commercial, altruistic and humanitarian objectives. These legal dis-
tinctions are closely intertwined with moral distinction drawing a boundary 
between self-motivated and other-motivated intent of associations, between 
material gain and altruistic support. Whilst this distinction is supposed to 
guarantee the protection of humanitarian acts, it also leaves room for con-
testation, blurring the boundaries between humanitarian and criminal con-
duct. According to the sm Protocol, for example, each state party is required 
to ‘adopt such legislative and other measure as may be necessary to establish 
61    Assisting to reside within the territory on the other hand requires the elements of inten-
tional assistance and financial gain (Article 1.1.b).
62    This exemption has been transposed into national law so far only for a handful of states, 
including France, Hungary, Sweden and the uk, some others have similar exemptions 
predating the directive including Italy, but a number of states still lack any exemp-
tion for humanitarian reasons. European Migration Network (2012), Ad-hoc Query on 
Exemption from Sanctions within the Context of Offence of Solidarity, compilation of 
20 December 2012.
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as  criminal offences, when committed intentionally and in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’ (Article 6). Whilst the 
concept of intentional direct financial benefit may appear to be clear, indirect 
and other material benefits open significant possibilities for contestation. As 
demonstrated in the Cap Anamur case, the definition of what counts as mate-
rial benefit is contested even for humanitarian organisations – demonstrating 
that even the for-profit/non-profit distinction can be easily used to prosecute 
humanitarian actors.
4.2 The Protection of Humanitarian Actors: On the Scope of Legislation
A further problem relating to the protection of humanitarian acts arises 
from the scope of the legislation. Even though untoc and its Protocols seek 
to target transnational organised crime, a cursory look reveals that many of 
sm Protocol’s clauses help construct a broad scope of criminalization. Article 
34(2) broadens the scope of the Convention beyond transnational organised 
crime by stating that neither the principles of ‘transnationality’ nor that of 
‘organised criminal group’ are required as elements when drafting domestic 
legislation. Or more explicitly ‘[t]hus the offences established in accordance 
with the Protocol should apply equally, regardless of whether they were com-
mitted by individuals or by individuals associated with an organized criminal 
group, and regardless of whether this can be proved or not’.63 This implies 
that any relations between irregular migrants and individuals, with or without 
transnational connections, with or without an organized criminal component, 
can be targeted, thus expanding the scope of criminal conduct, and paving the 
way for blurring the boundaries between criminal and humanitarian conduct.
The 2002 Directive has an even broader target population of sanctions. It 
does not only obscure the distinction between smugglers and rescuers, by 
rendering the protection of humanitarian actors optional, but also increases 
the scope of criminal sanctions. The 2002 Directive targets not only direct but 
also indirect aid, and extends identical sanctions from the person commit-
ting or attempting to commit the crime to accomplices and instigators alike 
(Article 2). This leaves humanitarian actors in a potentially lethal legal mine-
field as being an instigator, however defined, will suffice to draw criminal pen-
alties. Again, whilst the 2002 eu Directive needs to be brought in line with 
untoc and its Protocols, this would not be sufficient to safeguard humanitar-
ian actors. This leads us to the most fundamental problem of anti-smuggling 
63    See unodc (2004), Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols thereto, New York, 
ny: United Nations, p. 276.
 385Saving Lives At Sea
European Journal of Migration and Law 16 (2014) 365–387
and related  legislation as regards to safeguards for humanitarian acts and 
actors, the creation of suspicion.
4.3 The Protection of Humanitarian Acts: Suspicion and Social Relations
Anti-smuggling and related legislations create a broad suspect category. Any 
third party interaction related to the entry or crossing of borders of irregular 
migrants, even if not criminalized, becomes open for scrutiny – as to investi-
gate whether the acts in question fall under smuggling or related acts, whether 
they are pursued under the qualifying circumstances of financial or other 
material gain. This allows essentially placing anybody related to these acts – 
whether for gain, exploitation or not – in the suspect category, opening the 
possibility of prosecution. This is embedded within a wider mounting legal 
and normative consensus of criminal sanctions against third parties, not only 
for crossing borders, but also for providing employment, housing and other 
social interaction.64
By criminalizing certain acts and qualifying them as smuggling, anti-
smuggling legislation creates a distinction between legally authorized and 
unauthorized interactions between irregular migrants and the general public. 
Whilst untoc and its Protocols still limit unauthorized interactions largely to 
commercial interactions, eu legislation weakens these boundaries by dissolv-
ing the distinctions between for-profit and non-profit interactions, between 
commercial interactions and protection for humanitarian and family motives. 
It re-negotiates the boundaries between authorized and unauthorized inter-
action and by that also between criminal acts and humanitarian acts. Thus, 
it has the potential to criminalize all interactions between irregular migrants 
and the general public, if related to crossing the international border, and to 
ultimately dissolve the protection of humanitarian acts, effectively criminaliz-
ing and punishing not only economic, but any kind of social interactions with 
irregular migrants, including family relations and humanitarian acts.
As the boundaries between criminal acts and humanitarian acts are fluid, 
third parties, whatever their motives may be, can be governed in similar ways, 
based upon suspicion – and possibly criminalization – for their interaction 
with irregular migrants crossing borders. This has an important impact upon 
societal relations, widening the gap between irregular migrants and the gen-
eral population, leading eventually to lower levels of engagement with the 
suffering of irregular migrants. Whilst an explicit protection of humanitarian 
acts is urgently needed to set the proper normative standards, it is likely to be 
insufficient to avoid all implications of anti-smuggling laws, as these criminal 
64    See author’s research.
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laws invoke a general level of insecurity, anxiety and securitization targeting 
third parties in touch with irregular migrants.
5 Conclusion
Saving lives at sea is not simply a question of enhancing the eu rescue efforts, 
but primarily a question of eliminating sanctions and facilitating third party 
rescue efforts. Understanding the current problem not as a natural problem of 
geography and capacities, but as the result of the incremental securitization 
of rescue requires a different set of responses on saving lives at sea than those 
proposed by the eu. Hereby, it is important to point out that it is not rescue in 
the Mediterranean as such that poses a challenge, but the problem is limited 
to the rescue of irregular migrants. Enhancing rescue efforts will remain insuf-
ficient as long as rescue of irregular migrants is not decriminalized and desecu-
ritized. All seafarers that fulfil their duty to render assistance at sea should be 
protected and even more supported through eu legislation. eu policies need 
to desecuritize the Mediterranean to avoid further lives lost at sea and to allow 
seafarers to follow their international duties without fear of punishment.
Concretely, the following steps are required:
First, an important means in eliminating sanctions that impede rescue 
at seas is the elimination of criminal sanctions imposed by anti-smuggling 
laws for humanitarian acts, requiring a modification of the Council Directive 
2002/90/ec defining the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and resi-
dence. Equally all humanitarian acts need to be legally exempted from criminal 
and administrative sanctions in letter an in practice. An implicit protection of 
humanitarian acts, based upon a distinction between for-profit and non-profit 
acts, or an optional protection is insufficient. eu institutions need to endorse 
an explicit protection of humanitarian acts and provide easy possibilities of 
appeal by individuals and organisations for restrictions imposed. Whilst these 
steps might not be sufficient, at least they will allow for a normative consensus, 
anchored in law, for the protection of rescue and other humanitarian acts.
Second, rescue needs to be disentangled from border security issues. 
Currently, steps towards decriminalizing rescue continue to be embedded in 
a program of border security, subordinated to wider security concerns. This 
renders the rescue agenda highly vulnerable as it becomes merged with and 
even subsumed under security concerns. A joint rescue/security agenda is 
untenable, due to their conflicting nature. As one may need to be prioritized 
over the other, saving lives can be subordinated to broader security concerns. 
Embedding rescue within security is likely to continue the securitization of 
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rescue and is unable to efficiently tackle the problem of third party sanctions. 
Ultimately, embedding rescue within security will privilege rescue operations 
by border security agencies and marginalize third party rescue efforts.
Many of the proposals by the eu’s Task Force Mediterranean continue with 
current policies of prevention, security and rescue, increasing operational 
capacities of Frontex and the Member States, supplemented by border sur-
veillance technologies. The last decade has, however, illustrated that more of 
the same is not better. In spite of the number of people saved, it is evident 
that these policies have so far not succeeded in reducing the death toll. On the 
contrary, the death toll at European borders seems to be incessantly increas-
ing. Concentrating solely on the European Union’s rescue capacities is under 
these circumstances not sufficient; it is important to consider the concerns 
that impede rescue by seafarers. The elimination of sanctions to rescue is a first 
step in the right direction, but it needs to be complemented by desecuritiza-
tion efforts to be effective. Ultimately, the success of policies for saving lives 
can only be measured against a diminishing death toll at the borders.

